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With this article we aim to propose an analytical alternative to what we could call the substitution and 
condemnation of the spectator as an element of the new technological apparatuses. Actually, what we see in many 
of the current reflections on new media is that while the spectator is being accused of ultimate passivity, he is also 
being mobilized to emancipated action as an empowered user. Through the critique of an online application 
available on Portuguese Radio Television (RTP)’s website, the state-owned television network, called O Meu 
Telejornal1, we will try to demonstrate that we actually need to develop a spectator theory to critically understand 
the political position of the citizen within our changing contemporary media environment. 
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Introduction 
In March 2009, Portuguese public television network RTP debuted an internet application which allowed 
spectators to build their own rundown for their own newscast, based on the news stories the channel had 
previously broadcasted and that were made available on the network’s webpage. The service is called O Meu 
Telejornal, which means My Newscast, and initially was meant to represent a breakthrough from the current 
practice of disintegrating televised news shows into individual reports that were later uploaded onto the website. 
Using the application, the spectator could select and watch each news story separately or he could choose and 
sort the reports he was interested in and unify them into a user-generated newscast and could then view the 
entire selection in one sequence. Thus, the online spectator could create his own newscast.  
What this means is that this application, that we will analyze as a device or apparatus, not only breaks the 
unity of the traditional newscast but also a myriad of new individualized “unities” may emerge from the 
fragmented pieces of the traditional newscast. It also consecrates a potentially increasingly detemporalized 
relationship between TV producers and receptors, between the mandatory synchronicity of traditional TV 
broadcasting and the individual asynchronic processes sponsored by such technological possibilities of 
fragmentation-recomposition. But it also means that each of the new “totalities”, built as personal sequences, 
can constitute a discourse in itself, not similar or even comparable to any other discourse built by random  
users elsewhere. 
This technologically-driven apparatus sets some interesting questions: are these internet users able to share 
their own viewing experience as they are used to as TV news spectators? Are these viewing experiences even 
comparable? Are there any new types of shareable discourses emerging from this deconstruction of the old 
                                                                 
 Felisbela Lopes, Ph.D., Department of Communication Sciences, University of Minho. 
Luís M. Loureiro, Master, Department of Communication Sciences, University of Minho. 
1 O Meu Telejornal is an online application available on RTP’s Internet page that allows the spectators to build their own 
newscast based on the news reports uploaded onto the website. The best translation for it is My Newscast. 
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unity? Is the traditional spectator drowning in a technological ocean of users, or has the user perhaps become an 
increasingly “hidden” spectator?  
More than just finding the empirical answers to these questions, with this paper one of our aims is to 
propose a theoretical basis for a critical debate on what may very well be considered to be nothing more than a 
set of paradoxes emerging from a dominant way of conceiving technological applications such as O Meu 
Telejornal. Our hypothesis is that such applications can only come out of widely spread “technological 
determinism” inspired concepts that, on one hand, affirm technology as a decisive locomotive for social and 
individual emancipation but, on the other hand, tend to keep a dependant relationship between the 
user-spectator and the technology provider: actually, when the producer asks the receptor to do something, to 
take some action, even if that is presented as a “do-it-yourself” kind of thing, isn’t that a dissimulated way of 
the producer to stay in control over the whole production and viewing experience? There is also the paradox of 
the internet user who is instantly transformed, by means of the apparatus itself, into an immediate spectator of 
“his own” sequence. Our questioning will then revolve around the notion of the spectator and the place it 
occupies and/or is being mobilized to on a variety of old and new applications. Through what we will call a 
spectator kinetics analysis we think we may be in a better position to discuss how we, as citizens, relate to the 
changing media landscape. 
The Perspectival Frame as an Apparatus: The Immobilized Spectator 
While working on the concept of frame as a way of enclosing a vision of the world, and the concept of 
window as a metaphor that suits and delimits the contemporary visuality in regard to that world, the American 
researcher Anne Friedberg has come to realize how, with the technical reproduction of the image and the 
spectacle of the image, particularly since the 19th century, illustration, lithography and photography have 
extended the visible field (2001, p. 253). The French philosopher Paul Virilio had already explained it, however, 
as a battle field that had been socially established, progressively reducing the visual field “to the line of a 
sighting device” (1994, p. 13). With the technical reproduction of images “in multiplying ‘proofs’ of reality, 
photography exhausted it” (Virilio, 1994, p. 22). 
In between the formulation of a visual field that extends itself and another that tightens itself as if it were a 
battlefield, we will perhaps be in the face of a paradox. However, here we should consider separate aspects, 
both related to what we will henceforth designate as the spectator kinetics. On one hand, the idea of 
sociotechnical reproducibility of the spectacle that is to be produced as imagery interposition wherever the 
spectator is (Debord, 1992, pp. 15-16), i.e., the reproducibility as inducer of an apparent movement of images, 
eluding the immobilization of a spectator who, in that kinetic appearance of images, seems to be permanently 
set up in motion. On the other hand, a virtual mobility of the motionless spectator, along with the technical 
evolution of the reproduction, has been placed into action since the first modern spectacles of urban gaze 
requisition. Both are decisive analytical objects, and it will be between either one or the other that we will find 
a kinetic critique of the contemporary spectator, better understanding his real position in the midst of 
production and spectacle reproduction devices. 
Regarding this last consideration, Anne Friedberg took a look at the panoramas and dioramas from the late 
18th and early 19th centuries and analyzed the supply of a set of vision technologies that, based on the effective 
immobilization of the spectator, offered “a visual excursion and a virtual release from the confinements of everyday 
space and time” (2001, p. 261). A century later, this would be exactly what the cinema device would deepen. 
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Simultaneously, and still during the first half of the 19th entury, after Nièpce and Daguérre, the 
photographic image would develop a different relationship with the spectator, progressively offering itself, 
through its own technical reproducibility and portability, to the spectator’s physical mobility. As Roland 
Barthes recalls in Camera Lucida, photography meant a different kind of experience from the dioramas, the 
panoramas and, afterwards, the cinema: “I can barely stand the private screening of a film (there is not enough 
audience, nor enough anonymity), but I need to be alone in front of the photos I behold” (2006, p. 108). The 
contemplative immobilization required by photography thus opened an entirely new perspective over the 
immobilization of the spectator: it is now the spectacle that reaches the spectator wherever he may find himself.  
Photography promotes yet an individualization of the experience, describing, henceforth, a dance that the 
spectator of contemporaneity executes and choreographs daily. In truth, it is the very same optic inversion that 
Barthes suggests in the title of the last work he published in his lifetime, which turns out to be a metaphor of 
this extension of the radius of spectacular action and, by extension, of the physical mobility of the position of 
the spectator. If the camera obscura is the optical and mechanical principle in which the production of a 
photographic image is based, it’s the emergence of photography to light, i.e., the possibility of its outside 
contemplation, anywhere, in a daily camera lucida (Barthes, 2006, p. 117), which transports it next to      
the spectator. 
Anne Friedberg, however, proposes an analysis that attempts to understand the ideas of mobility and 
immobility of the spectator through the concept of frame. The American researcher deepens this analysis 
particularly in her recent book The Virtual Window, originally published in 2006. In it, Friedberg defends her 
thesis that the Renaissance window, that had instituted the notion of perspective in painting, was suggested as a 
metaphor by the Italian architect and theorist Leon Battista Alberti to mean not a transparent surface allowing 
the observation of something (as Leonardo da Vinci would explore later on), but a space that delimits the vision 
of the beholder. Thus, for Alberti “the frame was what mattered, not the view from a window” (Friedberg, 2009, 
p. 30), meaning that “in hiding, this ‘frame’, in reality, is what allows to see” (Godinho, 2004, p. 313). For 
Alberti, the surface of the window is not forcibly transparent but translucent (Friedberg, 2009, p. 32). The 
consequences of this assumption are immediate: on one hand, Alberti is defining a theoretical space that 
delimits eyesight and, for that reason, will imply a certain framework of the visible. Friedberg underlines the 
fact that Alberti leaves exclusively to the painter’s free judgement the size of the frame and his relationship 
towards it: it is the painter who defines the point of view but, with that definition, the painter is also defining a 
position for himself that he will not be able to escape from. Hence, being either the painter or the future 
spectator, it is only possible for the observer to have the correct access to the image contained in the frame if he 
positions himself according to a geometry of perspective defined by the frame, i.e., if his position is actually 
immobilized regarding the frame (2009, p. 30). Thus, the introduction of the perspectival window in painting is 
related to the immobilization of the spectator, who is now detained and self-enclosed in this space defined by 
the frame. 
Friedberg’s analysis on the imposed immobilization of the spectator by the perspectival window cannot, 
however, be taken yet as definitive, particularly when we reflect on an evolutionary model of subjectivity based 
on the notion of spectator. We know that in the Dioptrique Descartes provides the camera obscura as an optical 
model for the formation of the images of the world, comparing its functional principles to those of the human 
eye. And it is also in the camera obscura that Isaac Newton’s optical experiences and John Locke’s reflections 
on the foundations of human understanding are based. Art historian Jonathan Crary recalls this and concludes 
“MY NEWSCAST” IS NO LONGER OURS 
 
204 
that “The camera obscura has become a model of both the observation of empirical phenomena and of 
introspective reflection and self-observation” (2001, p. 246), which for this author relates it to a metaphysics of 
interiority. Actually, besides inducing a clear separation between subject and object, as is the case in the 
perspectival window, the camera obscura operates a simultaneous observation and production of the image, 
albeit disguising the observer within the device. The observer, though located inside (or, at least, his view is) 
does not hold a defined position, he is “a more fluid inhabitant of darkness” (Crary, 2001, p. 246). If it is true 
that the image formed through the camera obscura apparatus is a perspectival image, Anne Friedberg (2009, p. 
66) underlines that it is an image in movement, which makes it different from the frozen image, set by the 
Albertian frame. Hence, it is as image production devices that this researcher makes the distinction between 
them, considering that the camera obscura was more a simple model for the importation and projection of 
moving images (Friedberg, 2006, pp. 68-71) than a model of visuality in the subsequent centuries. This means 
that, according to the author, the camera obscura does not allow us to fully understand the relationship between 
a perspectival vision of the world and the immobile position of the spectator, starting from the Renaissance 
period. This would happen later, though, when within the cinema apparatus, both the perspectival window and 
the camera obscura models mingled, becoming paradigmatic and definitive as for the prevalence of a visuality 
model over an image projection model: “A key component of the spectator’s position in the cinematic century 
was to be immobile in front of the frame of the screen” (Friedberg, 2009, p. 87).  
Anne Friedberg’s work on the mobility and immobility of the spectator will allow us to better understand 
the outcome of a framed view of the world: as a screen, the window is the definition of a given delimitation of 
the view of the world and implies at all times a halt of the spectator against the frame (of the window, the 
screen) that will define the space in which the image of the world is made visible. 
If the perspectival window defines and provides a singular point of view it will relate with the 
metaphysical position of the Cartesian subject “centered and stable, autonomous and thinking, standing outside 
of the world” (Friedberg, 2009, p. 47). From the original formulation of French semiologist Christian Metz, 
American historian and sociologist Martin Jay analyzed and defined, in his widely cited 1988 essay Scopic 
Regimes of Modernity, the Cartesian perspectivism as the modern hegemonic scopic regime (1988, pp. 4-5). 
However, Jay explains that, although dominant, perspectivism was never alone. Moreover, it is significant that 
the perspectivist point of view implies a singular eye instead of the two from which human eyesight is 
composed, an eye understood as “static, unblinking, and fixated, rather than dynamic, moving with (…) 
saccadic jumps from one focal point to another” (Jay, 1988, p. 7). So, Cartesian perspectivism supplies an 
essentially theoretical visual regime and within it a rational separation between spectacle and spectator is 
consummated by creating an ever growing distance: “the moment of erotic projection in vision, what St. 
Augustine had anxiously condemned as “ocular desire”, was lost as the bodies of the painter and spectator were 
forgotten in the name of an alledgedly disincarnated, absolute eye” (Jay, 1988, p. 8).  
Let’s then focus on the consequences for the spectator of this framed view of the world that has been 
provided since the Renaissance by the rational perspectival regime. In fact, be it according to a singular, 
centered and unique perspective like the one provided since the 15th century by the Italian Renaissance 
perspective, be it the multiple contemporary perspectives that begin to become particularly clear on the movie 
screen, about which “The movement of the image and the mechanics of editing and montage contradict the idea 
of a consistent, positioned ‘single-point’ perspective frame” (Friedberg, 2009, p. 83), one cannot deny, from the 
visual frame provided by the window, the consequences that the theoretical notion of perspective has had on the 
“MY NEWSCAST” IS NO LONGER OURS 
 
205
point of observation and, from there on, on the modeling of modern vision. As Anne Friedberg underlines, 
regardless of the questions we could ask concerning a perspectivist view of the world, “It is the consistency of 
the frame that performs the unity of space” (2009, p. 84).  
The same will not happen with other modular aspects that have been questioned by the evolution of 
visuality. Actually, it is in alternative scopic regimes that Martin Jay analyzes certain aspects, such as the 
narrative, that have been questioned over the last few centuries. On this matter, Jay refers the way the 17th 
century descriptive art of Northern Europe, particularly in the Netherlands in the work of such artists as 
Johannes Vermeer—who Jay believes to have created the first alternative scopic regime from Cartesian 
perspectivism, promoted a greater de-narrativization and loss of textual reference in favor of description and 
visual surface (Jay, 1988, p. 12). A direct consequence of this understanding may have been the rejection of a 
“priviledged, constitutive role of the monocular subject” emphasizing “the prior existence of a world of objects 
depicted on the flat canvas” (idem). It all comes down to an alternative that dispenses the theoretical observer: 
from focused and singular, the point of view shifted to “the fragmentary, detailed, and richly articulated surface 
of a world it is content to describe rather than explain” (1988, p. 13). As Martin Jays writes, we are closer to an 
empirical visual experience than to the theoretical model provided by the Cartesian perspectivism, hence the 
author’s consideration that the Flemish and Dutch descriptive art would anticipate future visual models (idem). 
One of the main directions we are aiming at is, precisely, this one: the contemporary introduction of an ever 
greater speed in the human relation with the optical visible sends us, inevitably, to the notion of an increasingly 
clear pellicular surface, a sensorial friction on a fast interface that crushes distances and essentially develops an 
accelerated scanning through a lateral kinetic gaze. If the kinetic effect of the perspectivist rationalism was a 
visual strategy that allowed “our culture to hold the world in space and analyze it in time” (Kerchhove, 1997, p. 
67), meaning, stopping the world by separating it as an object, we must otherwise deal with a motion optics in 
our empirical experience of everyday life. Our lateral visuality becomes then more descriptive than narrative.  
The loss of the singular point of view or, in other words, the theoretical exemption of a fixed observer, 
detained by the spatial definition of the perspectivist cone, will mean the empirical release of the physical body: 
in fact, the spectator is only physically immobilized in the theoretical device of perspectival observation. With 
this, we could suggest that the spectator’s everyday experience of modernity, albeit still dominated by a 
theoretical model that immobilizes him to a distanced and rational contemplation, may have confirmed, due to 
his daily experience of a fully enlightened world, a natural tendency for an induced mobility. The hypothesis we 
are exploring implies then an analysis of this opposition: on one hand, a theoretical model for the elaboration of 
the modern spectator that, by bringing the light from the divine to the optical field, resulted in the confinement 
and immobilization of the spectator defining for him a single point of view and, on the other hand, the 
mobilization effect that the dissemination of optical light had in the empirical position and kinetics of the 
spectator. However, this is a confrontation that cannot be fully understood without the diagnosis of a paradox: 
we know that the mobility acquired and conquered by the modern spectator is immediately and constantly 
contradicted when we dive into the snare of the contemporary apparatuses of spectacular image. That is one of 
the consequences of Anne Friedberg’s diagnosis that it is important to retain: the contemporary generation of an 
imagery interface that finds its spectator wherever he may be, is intimately related with his constant framing by 
reproduction devices. The spectator is still contained in observation frames. Thus, the contemporary 
mobilization of the spectator will continue to be dominated and contained. As Paul Virilio would conclude, we 
are then dealing with a false mobilization: 
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There, where the motorization of transports and information has caused a general mobilization of populations dragged 
in the exodus of labor, and after that of leasure, the means of instant transmission are inversely causing a growing inertia, 
mostly television and tele-action no longer require the mobility of people, just their mobility while standing in the same 
place. (Virilio, 2000, p. 43). 
Actually, in spite of being questioned by alternative empirical visuality regimes, the notion of frame, or 
framing, developed under the Renaissance perspective, would remain dominant over the spectator’s position 
until contemporaneity. Regardless of the persistence of the perspectivist model, of a greater or lesser 
prominence of narratives contained in the framework or the media that were used for creation, presentation or 
projection of images, the immobilized spectator in the theater, the cinema, in front of television or computer 
screens, even the allegedly mobile spectator of the spectacle of photographic image or of the socially broader 
kinetic imagery interposition of contemporaneity, all are more or less contained in an access to the visible 
model orientated by the concept of the frame.  
Several authors, like Anne Friedberg, believe though that not all contemporary screens should be read 
from this theoretical perspectivist regime standpoint. The author argues that the computer screen fostered a 
fundamental change regarding its predecessors: in spite of demanding a vertical permanence of an observer 
(immovable in front of the screen) whose gaze is still directed towards a relatively perpendicular surface, 
much like in cinema or television, the windows overlapping on the computer screen cancel the perspective 
(2009, p. 28). Thus, we would be placed before an important theoretical shift considering Leon Battista 
Alberti’s window concept that was based on the observation, from a fixed position, of a virtual image 
elaborated according to the geometric principles of perspective. Hence, for the Italian architect and humanist, 
the metaphor of the picture and of its frame as a window: what we observe, through physical windows, is the 
world that extends itself beyond that interposed glass surface thus giving continuity to a perspectival view. 
So, if the world outlined and defined by the frame was what mattered most to Alberti, Friedberg proposes an 
analysis that is held on what is actually seen inside of that frame. When observed this way, the successive 
and overlapping windows opened on the computer screen may have new implications on the spectator’s 
position that are important to understand: the computer screen would now operate according to a visual 
regime that would place the spectator kinetics in a new analytical post-perspectival region, when opposed to 
previous screens and surfaces of imagery reproduction. In this new region, the spectator would make way for 
the user.  
In an identical train of thought follow the arguments of University of Minho communicologist Zara 
Pinto-Coelho. On one of the chapters of the collective work Ecrã, Paisagem e Corpo (published in 2010), the 
Portuguese researcher observes, from authors like Lev Manovich, the existence of and opposition between 
cinema, video and television screens on one hand and, on the other, the interactive computer screens: 
concerning the former, a vision regime that remains stabilized manifests itself, continuing the screen to be the 
“border, the limit, the flat and rectangular table placed in the physical space of the spectator, ahead of him and 
at a certain distance” (Pinto-Coelho, 2010, p. 21), matching then the Renaissance frame; on the contrary, in the 
latter case the computer screen means a new instability of that old relation: “the screen is conceived as a 
welcoming space, mobile and malleable”, making the relationship with the represented world no longer 
“contemplative and of spectator” (2010, p. 22).  
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The Untold Story of the Empowered User 
The very insistence on the idea of empowerment is symptomatic of an ongoing replacement of the 
spectator. While the spectator is conceptually labeled as passive and, therefore, unable to act, the new agents 
that suppletively arise in its aid will be those who, emerging from everyday effectuality, anchor their 
empowerment in daily acquired capacities and skills (inevitably promoted by technologies) and, consequently, 
show their autonomous ability to individually intervene in the ordinary world. It is all about achieving the 
modern promise of the seizure of the power to act, by the empowered individual, through the consummation of 
a technical erotica in which the will to control becomes the “political problem par excellence” (Miranda, 2007, 
p.151). So, empowerment bears the promise of the realization of what the German philosopher Hannah Arendt 
designates the popular myth of the strong man who, “isolated from others, owes his own strength to the fact 
that he’s alone” (2001, p. 238). One should look out for the way this myth states and reveals itself, for example, 
in the disentanglements proposed by MIT technologist and convergence culture theorist Henry Jenkins when he 
defines the relationships that oppose an everyday variation of the empowered user, the empowered consumer, 
to the old version of the consumer that gave rise to it: 
If old consumers were assumed to be passive, the new consumers are active. If old consumers were predictable and 
stayed were you told them to stay, then new consumers are migratory, showing a declining loyalty to networks or media. If 
old consumers were isolated individuals, the new consumers are more socially connected. If the work of media consumers 
was once silent and invisible, the new consumers are now noisy and public. (Jenkins, 2008, pp. 18-19) 
Concerning this promised seizure of the power of action by contemporary consumers and users, we should 
stress the way widely cited authors such as Manuel Castells or Pierre Lévy totally discard the political notion of 
the spectator from their reflections on the so-called new virtual agoras. In Internet Galaxy (originally published 
in 2001), the network society theorist distinguishes only between producers-users, responsible for feeding and 
refeeding the network, and users-consumers, who are placed on the side of reception (Castells, 2004, p. 55). To 
both sides, Castells presents “the control of that public agora” as the “most important political challenge the 
Internet presents” (2004, p. 197). In what he’s been calling achievable utopias Lévy goes even further, writing 
in Cyberdemocracy (2002) that cybercitizens, the internet users capable of action in the virtual agora, “have 
much to say” (Lévy, 2003, p. 57) and that “the Internet is an extraordinary vector for the liberation of speech” 
(Lévy, 2003, p. 64). Invested, by technology, with this new power of global discourse, cybercitizens would then 
create the perfect action conditions to materialize the predictions of the French philosopher: “dictatorships will 
fall at the rhythm of the expansion of cyberculture” (Lévy, 2004, p. 65).2 Therefore, under these formulations 
we are able to confirm that, while conceptually neglecting the spectator, what is presented to us is, invariably, 
the promise of enhancement of the contemporary user and consumer through technology, with the resulting 
elevation of their ability to act as citizens. What emerges here is, conceptually, a user-actor or a user-consumer, 
presented under the empowerment of the user or of the consumer mode. 
We, on the contrary, think that it is in this precise negligence of the spectator that resides the analytic 
                                                                 
2 One could argue that the revolutionary processes triggered, in the beginning of 2011, in several Muslim countries, side-by-side 
with persistent news about the importance the internet social networks have played in the popular mobilization, will prove Pierre 
Lévy right, validating his prediction. However, we believe that any analysis that neglects the full scrutiny of the respective public 
spaces, under the guise of technological determinism, will get caught up in an analytical precipitation, slipping into a dangerously 
simplistic empiricism. The quickness of the contemporary mobilization processes, surely enabled by communication technologies, 
will not mean that their origins shouldn’t be researched in depth. Although we cannot do that in the scope of this article, that is the 
path we defend for the investigation of these phenomena. 
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persistence of an error that is producing a degradation of citizenship and political action to its current spectacular 
status—the emerging citizen of contemporaneity is the one made possible, allowed and contained by consumerism 
and usability. See, for example, the recurring accusations of increasing spectacularization made against activities 
that are traditionally perceived as being part of the sphere of citizenship such as politics or journalism, both 
constantly drained by an intense scan of light (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 55; Martins, 2003, p. 8). In fact, when we 
oppose to this, thoughts such as the ones proposed, e.g., in Arendt’s theses concerning the public and private 
spheres, we shall take notice of how such operative formulas suffer from a mortal paradox: only the object of use 
is shareable and never the use or the consumption itself, meaning that all types of usage, even if performed in the 
public sphere (in what Arendt designates as the exchange market), will have the effect of isolating the user, which 
will result in his effective impotence, rendering any condition for political action impossible (Arendt, 2001, pp. 
237, 252). These growing fears of growing isolation and closure for political action are, moreover, present in other 
contemporary reflections, such as those proposed by Ethics expert Christine Rosen in 2005, by minting the age of 
individualized media uses and consumption we live in as the age of egocasting (2005, pp. 51-72).  
In the empirical substitutes proposed for the spectator we, therefore, subsume a user of the things of the 
world who, supposedly, acquired such a grasp over them that he begins to act autonomously. In other words, 
the empowered user or the empowered consumer we encounter in the contemporary wordings of a new 
emancipated spectator, instigated and installed by the new information and communication technologies, 
crossed the once immovable borderline of the greek theatron, leapt into the inside of the proscenium (diving 
into the screen’s window?) becoming a user-actor: a hybrid concept that, in reality, never existed in the polis. 
The fact is that, by embracing these formulas, we would fatally find ourselves in the analytical domains of a 
new paradigm. But, we have good reason to believe that, instead of promoting an active alternative to the 
spectator, these considerations will let themselves be sweetly tamed by the siren song of spectacular determinist 
domination, enabling it. Namely, they will do nothing more than dig a real, deeper and irreducible gap between 
the spectacle (and its true actors) and the spectator, referring him to a passive and dominated position, 
submitting him to the “prison of global mobilization” (López-Petit, 2010, p. 53). 
One of the contemporary authors that support our analytical proposition is Maria-José Mondzain. In her 
argumentation, the French semiologist defends that “Every spectacle brings into play the freedom of the 
spectator depending on the position assigned to him in respect to the screen by the director or videomaker” 
(2009, p. 40). This is to be able to diagnose and unhide the domination it will be necessary for us to understand 
how, given their current configuration, the apparatuses elaborate the spectator’s (understood in all its 
contemporary extension, as consumer, user, spectator and actor) position particularly through its intrinsic 
kinetics and the way these kinetics interact with optics, promoting illusory perceptions as to the spectator’s real 
position within these devices. 
The approach proposed in 2006 by American researcher Michele White, in her book The Body and the 
Screen resorts to these apparatus theories, among others, to develop a set of theses that allow the recovery of 
the notion of the spectator, analyzing it in the contemporary environments of interaction generated by the 
technological screen. In fact, White opposes the need for a spectator to the idea, generally accepted, that only a 
user should be considered when dealing with the characterization of the human relationship with the computer 
screen (2006, p. 8). The author notes that, in all fairness, when concepts such as empowered user (a user who is, 
allegedly, given absolute power over the choice of his paths and control over the screens’ contents) are 
privileged analytically, it is technology itself and the very hierarchy of control over the computer program that 
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are submerged and dissimulated in the representations created for and on the screen: in that respect, an 
inadvertent and dominated spectator is elaborated for that screen (White, 2006, pp. 30; 32). For White, this is 
the empowered user: a spectator that is mobilized to enter, to surf, to navigate, i.e., to move within a space 
created by the narrative the environment describes. On screen, attached to the movements of the spectator’s 
hand, the cursor is represented by an arrow that points, a hand that clicks, grabs and shifts (White, 2006, pp. 
22-23, 29). Besides placing the spectator in the environment, “the different images of the hand render an 
empowered user who can point, move, grasp and touch. The depictions of hands stand in for the whole body, 
suggest that the individual can enter the setting” (White, 2006, p. 14). And it is upon entry that this alleged 
plenipotentiary spectator is invited to explore a living, biological (2006, p. 20) world, filled with new 
possibilities, never seen landscapes, never lived experiences. Beyond the border of the screen will be, as 
Michele White points out, a populated world (2006, p. 21), where seeing and being are connected with the 
conceptualization of a “telepresence as an extension of the spectator’s ‘reach’ and ‘means’ of visit” (2006, p. 
30). So, “The window onto another world, which narratives about the computer promise, is becoming 
increasingly easy to breach” (2006, p. 32).  
However, just like White’s studies suggest, not always this relationship develops as is supposed. There are 
several moments of failure, frustration over the empowerment promised to the spectator. By highlighting the 
technology or media producer occultation paradox, those moments demonstrate that the empowered user is 
nothing but the result of spectatorial positions promoted by the representations on screen. A stripped, 
disempowered spectator emerges from this realization, ultimately placed in the position he truly holds. Therefore, 
these are moments that reinforce the hierarchic power of the programmer over the spectator (2006, p. 23), that 
expose an effective domination, exercised, now, in a clearly more euphemistic mode, concealed in the promise of 
offering the spectator total control over a device that, in fact, is controlled by the technology producer, the 
programmer. It is symptomatic that, for at least two decades, technological mobility theorists converged to the 
conclusion that “The most successful technologies are the ones that are embedded in the environment, used in the 
backstage, without making their presence known” (Ganito, 2009, p. 187). The contemporary mobilization of the 
spectator is then most effective when the technologies that promote it are disguised in the apparatuses. Aren’t we 
actually finding here the very signs of domination that we alluded to earlier? 
We reached this diagnosis by analyzing the user-spectator’s dubious position in the O Meu Telejornal (My 
Newscast) application, available since March 2009 on Portugal’s public television station’s website, 
www.rtp.pt (Loureiro, 2009, pp. 163-172)3. This apparatus elaborates a poorly defined position for its spectator, 
having based, as we argued in the previously cited paper, its functional principles on the technological 
deterministic4 stream, meaning the predominance of technoscientific advances over social intrinsic dynamics. 
Actually, O Meu Telejornal makes the promise of full control to the online spectator: the idea that the newscast 
is a device that can be drawn out however the spectator sees fit is passed down. Emerged in the offer of a 
                                                                 
3 We would go further in this analysis in co-authorship with Felisbela Lopes in a communication presented at the 2010 IAMCR 
conference, held at the University of Minho, in Portugal, between the 18th and 22nd of July. 
4 One should take into account the reasoning of RTP’s former News Director, José Alberto Carvalho, who published a news 
report (aired by the networks mains newscast on March 2nd 2009) where he justifies O Meu Telejornal with the realization that 
“from now on, each spectator can build his own newscast”, meaning that thanks to the possibilities offered by technology the 
spectator can now “put the matters that don’t interest him aside and watch those which are more important to him over and over 
again”. This means that from what technology allows and enhances, the user-spectator is invited to take on a role that, until then, 
was reserved to the networks’ reporters, freely making their own decisions regarding news consumption and are even given the 
possibility to elaborate their own newscast. The entire speech is accompanied by a visual exemplification of the usage proposed.  
“MY NEWSCAST” IS NO LONGER OURS 
 
210 
producer that is lost in the background, the spectator is invited to choose, on the website, the news reports he 
wishes to see and define that order in which he will see them. This means that the true instance of news 
production for the newscast is, immediately, hidden: it does not show itself, nor does it reveal that, in all 
truthiness, those reports, which have been placed at the spectator’s command, were thought, produced and 
aligned before, in the midst of the television programmer and producer’s job and in which the spectator has no 
involvement. The computer screen spectator, whose online representation is now of an empowered user, is 
given a power that the spectator sitting on a couch and in front of a television screen could not have: 
supposedly, he can make his own newscast, where the temporal and hierarchical orders are irrelevant in his 
organization of the news as are the discursive logics that ingrained the newscast in its original televised format.  
But there will come a moment where the dissimulation will abruptly stop its effect: by being invited to 
create his own newscast, the spectator will implicitly be also invited to hand over the power he had apparently 
been entrusted with, in the very moment he makes the transition from choosing and ordering to seeing. 
Following all the steps proposed by O Meu Telejornal, the spectator will end up building a single aggregate of 
television news, an aligned individualized newscast, where the sequential viewing of the reports will place them 
one after the other. Since they were chosen from a disconnected mosaic in which the reports are presented 
randomly comparatively to the original moment they were broadcasted, meaning that there is no relation 
whatsoever with the discursive and temporal hierarchy that defined them within the original televised device, 
the online spectator will be confronted simultaneously with two consequences: his own O Meu Telejornal 
became a sequential aggregator of reports with a total duration that is the sum of all the stories the spectator 
chose (it can be 3 or 30 minutes long) and the rundown may have more to do with the order of a random choice, 
based on the now (I want to watch) than with a previously defined hierarchical temporal order by the spectator. 
This means that when the time comes to watch it, his O Meu Telejornal may no longer be what the spectator 
wants to watch. So, in all these successive confrontations, a potential frustration with this relationship is 
generated, proving, after all, that the power given to the spectator fades away in the paradox of its own dubious 
position: in the end, all that is left is a spectator who has been stripped from his power and, to take it back, must 
give up on completing the invitation that had been addressed to him. 
This analysis complements and, in certain aspects, materializes what we had already argued in 2009, when 
the O Meu Telejornal application was made available online. Actually, leaning exclusively on some of the 
theories we have developed regarding the application, the above mentioned article took a shot at a set of 
perplexities and paradoxes in which the then new application proposed by RTP’s website was, ab initio, 
theoretically entangled. As we said at the time, “It would appear that, in its origin, O Meu Telejornal was 
formed according to the perspective of a service for users that will have the difficulty in dealing with the 
possibility of them becoming spectators” (Loureiro, 2009, p. 170). Bear in mind that although O Meu 
Telejornal is no longer a novelty, it is still a rare commodity on network websites, a fact that might be related to 
its near statistic irrelevance on RTP’s website. According to data collected at RTP, and that we presented at a 
conference at the University of Porto entitled Virtual Places: Spaces Created for the Spectator, on April 30th 
2010, during the year 2009 (from March to November) 1,000 rundowns were created on O Meu Telejornal, a 
number that when compared with the 5,413,288 viewings of reports online (from January to December 2009) 
demonstrates the near total alienation of spectators/users of the networks’ website regarding the application that 
supposedly empowered them over the contents that were made available for online viewing: a daily average of 
about 14,831 viewings per report is met by a laughable average of 3.3 rundowns produced every day. Unlike 
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what usually happens with successful internet experiences, the online presence of television networks continues 
to do without applications such as O Meu Telejornal, preferring to keep a fragmented supply of its contents, 
where the viewing takes place immediately upon choice, i.e., retaining the empowered user as a representation 
of the online spectator and avoiding paradoxical situations as the one we have just encountered.  
The concepts of immobility and mobility may be admirably considered at this instance: the computer 
screen spectator, drawn up as an empowered user by the technology and screen representations is built over the 
very ideas of mobility and mobilization, as we have already discussed. Online environments are arranged as 
spaces that appeal to the path, the journey towards discovery. All the promised spatial mobility will come from 
the supposed ability of the spectator to move, choose, click, enter and leave: his ability to autonomously work. 
By frustrating these representations of an autonomous and decision-making spectator, by requiring his effective 
immobilization towards the integral viewing of a program, the existence of which the empowered user only 
acknowledges the moment he completes his choices, an application such as O Meu Telejornal is not doing 
anything other than revealing the sudden truth of the spectator: he is only allegedly mobile, all the usage power 
is drained at the exact moment the spectator verifies the magnitude of his impotence, the domain of the 
production instance over the so-called user.  It is the production instance that maintains control over 
movement and distance. It is in its inexorable immobility before the screen, suddenly separated, that the 
spectator finds himself: in spite of the covert modes of the spectacle, the spectator actually never left his seat, 
remaining detained by the screen, while his very glance is still directed to the light, just as his body is still 
commanded by it as it brightens and defines the profile of the spectacle of the visible, shining over him. It is, in 
this traumatic borderline of sudden revelation for which there would be a failure of representations, what, in 
Lacanian psychoanalytical terms, we could describe as the shock of the Real5. 
The Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, a Lacan reader, actually proposes an interesting inversion of the 
terms of the problem. For Žižek, it is interactivity in a transitive sense, i.e., a true deprivation of the passivity 
the machine operates, that is revealed in the immobilization shock of the cyberspatial spectator: “the other is 
active for me, acts on my behalf; I act through him, making me increasingly dependent of my digital prosthesis 
and unable to act directly” (2006, p. 15). The potential frustration lies perennially in the idea of interactivity: in 
this regard, while I’m deprived of inactivity by the other, I find myself, actually, stripped of true activity. In fact, 
I’m motionless, deeming myself interactive, ubiquitous and kinetic.  
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